This paper examines affirmative action in engineering colleges in India for "lower-caste" groups. Affirmative action successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the marginal upper-caste applicant comes from a richer background than the marginal lower-caste applicant. Our analysis suggests that, despite lower entrance exam scores, the marginal lower-caste entrant obtains a positive return to admission. However, the point estimates are also consistent with the idea that the affirmative action programs come at an absolute cost, as the negative income level effect experienced by displaced upper-caste applicants is much larger than the positive income level effect experienced by displacing lower-caste students. One reason for this is that a smaller fraction of lower-caste admits obtains engineering jobs. Finally, our results show that among the lower-caste admits, it is those from stronger socio-economic backgrounds who benefit most from the reservation policy. This result somewhat weakens the case that the policy benefits the economically disadvantaged.
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Introduction
Many countries around the world mandate affirmative action in higher education, where groups that have historically faced discrimination are given preferential admissions. In the context we study-state controlled colleges in India-more than 50 percent of admissions slots are reserved for the members of lower-caste groups. In this paper, we empirically examine the impact of affirmative action in education to understand its effectiveness in redistributing both opportunity and income to marginalized groups.
We are motivated by the vigorous debate surrounding affirmative action programs. 1 The debate is focused on two main issues. The first issue centers on the question of who these programs actually target. Many claim that affirmative action only benefits a small sliver of the population: those of the traditionally disadvantaged group that actually come from economically advantageous backgrounds. 2 Specifically, if the marginal admit of the "disadvantaged" group comes from a richer household than the marginal admit of the "advantaged" group, affirmative action programs may actually be regressive in nature. Put another way, such programs may take slots from less advantaged members of an advantaged group and give them to individuals who are more advantaged, but just happen to belong to a less advantaged group. The second issue is whether and how much these programs actually help those who gain admissions-the so-called "mismatch" hypothesis.
3 4 compared to 84 percent of the "displacers." As a whole, however, our evidence suggests that targeting by social group also serves (at the margin) to target the socio-economically disadvantaged.
We next examine labor-market outcomes. Our point estimates suggest that, despite much lower basic skills (as measured by the score on the entry exam), those who are admitted by affirmative action economically benefit from attending engineering college. Depending on the specifications, attending engineering school increases lower-caste members' monthly income by between Rs 3,500 and Rs 6,200. This corresponds to an increase of 40 to 70 percent, which is comparable to the rate of return for upper-caste groups. However, our point estimates also suggest that the affirmative action programs come at an absolute cost, as the negative income level effect experienced by displaced upper-caste applicants is much larger than the positive income level effect experienced by displacing lower-caste students. Due to the large standard errors in some of the econometric models we estimate, we cannot, however, formally reject the hypothesis that the reallocation of educational is efficient. A final, rather robust, finding is that there is heterogeneity across caste categories in which subgroups benefit most from attending engineering college.
Specifically, in the lower-caste group, it is those from higher socio-economic backgrounds that appear to derive significant positive returns. The opposite holds in the upper-caste group. This suggests some strong complementarities between education and socio-economic background for members of the lower castes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the history of affirmative action policies in India. Section 3 describes the data and methodologies. Our findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our main findings and suggestions for future work.
History of Affirmative Action Policies in India
The roots of India's current affirmative action policies date back to the colonial-era reservation programs for government jobs, political representation, and scholarships established under British rule (Kumar, 1992) .
The first recorded affirmative action policies in India were quota systems for administrative positions in the more progressive state governments, such as Mysore in South India, and Baroda and Kolhapur in Western India (Das, 2000) . Political reservations soon followed: the first caste-based lists of reserved, parliamentary seats were published under British rule in 1936 (Osborne, 2001 ).
With independence from Britain in 1947, Jawaharal Nehru and the Congress Party chose to maintain the British system of reserving seats in the legislature (Osborne, 2001) . Article 46 of India's Constitution contained a directive to provide special considerations to members of the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), the two most 5 disadvantaged groups in India. 7 This paved the way for both the central government and the individual states to adopt reservations in college admissions for the SC and ST groups (Weisskopt, 2003) . 8 The prevalence of reserved seats from members of the "other backward categories" (OBC)-a group that was more advantaged than the SC and ST, but less advantaged than the upper-caste groups-is more limited.
While the constitution prohibited discrimination against the OBC,it did not institute any specific affirmative action policies for them. In 1953, the central government formed a commission to study the situation of the OBC. The commission recommended that an additional 2,399 "backward" castes-roughly 40 percent of the populationshould also be eligible for reservations (de Zwart, 2000b) . This recommendation was not acted upon, however.
Instead, the central government left the power to grant concessions to other backward caste groups to individual states. Thus, while many states began to institute reserved seats for the OBC in state controlled colleges, there were no reserved seats for OBC in nationally controlled colleges (Baley, 1999) . In 1978, the central government formed a second exploratory commission-known as the Mandal Commission-to explore again the situation of the OBC.
It identified 3,747 castes, or 52 percent of the population, as backward (de Zwart, 2000b; Wolpert, 2006) . It recommended a 27% reservation for the OBC for university admissions, public-sector jobs and all private-sector endeavors that receive financial assistance from the government (Kumar, 1992; Weisskopt, 2003) .
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The original reservations specified in India's Constitution were set to expire in 1960. They have since been extended several times over, and are now set to expire in 2010. In all colleges controlled by the central government, 7.5 percent of seats have been reserved for the ST and 15 percent of seats have been reserved for the
The report was shelved until 1990, when the central government reported that it would enforce the recommendations of the Commission only for public-sector jobs. This announcement led to widespread rioting and protest (Osborne, 2001 ).
In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld the Mandal reservations public-sector jobs, and also ruled that the central government and all state governments must exclude the "creamy layer," i.e. richer members, of the OBC from the reservations in public sector jobs (Osborne 2001 , Wolpert, 2006 .
7 "The state shall promote with special care the education and economic interests of the weaker sections of people, and, in particular, of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.
Who is a member of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes has been defined under article 366 of the Constitution." 8 While the Constitution originally banned any kind of discrimination specifically in college admissions, it was amended in 1951 to allow the government discretion in whether to provide any special consideration for the advancement of the SC and ST. 9 The Commission would have preferred to recommend that the OBC groups receive a 52 percent quota, in addition to the 22.5 percent already set aside for SC and ST. However, the Supreme Court had already ruled that central-government reservations could not exceed 50 percent. As such, the Commission recommended a 27 percent reservation for the OBC (Wolpert, 2006 10 Limited data on the composition of caste existed, much less on the composition of caste by occupation, as the 1931 Census was the last census to have collected caste information. Thus, the population figures that are the basis of the reservations policy are much disputed, even today (Pande, 2003) . 11 "Educational institutions" has been left undefined. Thus, many claim that this amendment now allows the government, if it chooses, to implement reservations in all levels of schooling, and not just university education.
In May 2006, the government announced a plan to extend the 27 percent reservation for the OBC to all central universities, resulting in massive protests. Parliament passed the bill in the winter session of 2006 . However, in March 2007 , the Supreme Court gave a stay order on the bill, citing the lack of data on which groups are indeed economically and socially disadvantaged. Thus, as in many other countries, affirmative action continues to dominate the policy debate in India.
Data and Methodology
This section details the admission process for an engineering degree in the state where our research occurs. It also discusses the sample construction and survey design. We conclude with a discussion of attrition.
Admission Process for an Engineering Degree
During the start of his or her final year of high school, an individual must sit for a general college admissions examination (called the "10+2 examination"). The score on this exam and caste category fully determine admissions to most colleges. To gain admission into very prestigious programs or universities-such as medical and engineering colleges-in a particular state, each individual must first pass the 10+2 exam. Individuals who have passed this exam can then take a second-round statewide entrance exam.
In this paper, we use data from the second-round entrance exam to engineering colleges in one Indian state.
The exam consisted of three sections-math, physics and chemistry-each with 100 multiple choice questions worth 3 points each, for a total of 900 points. After taking the exam, individuals were ranked based on their total score for each caste category (General, OBC, SC, and ST). 12 Starting from the highest ranking in each caste category, an individual was invited for a counseling session where he/she was informed about possibilities for admissions to the different engineering colleges. The individual then chose whether he/she would like to attend, and if so, which college and type of engineering course he/she wanted to pursue.
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Since states can increase the reserved seats for each caste group, the actual percentage of reserved seats varies from state to state. In the state-year we study, a total of 2,643 seats were available, with 2,054 seats open to the reservations policy; the remainder were payment seats not covered by the policy.
The process continued down the rankings until all seats in the colleges were full.
14 12 For individuals with the same score, individuals are ranked first by math score, then by chemistry score, and finally by physics score. In the circumstance that individuals have the same three scores, the birthday determines the time-the older individual obtains the higher rank. As such, each individual has a unique ranking. 13 Individuals with a higher ranking, therefore, get a choice about which institute to attend and which subject within engineering (major) to study. Since the reservation percentages cut across each institution and each branch, it is impossible to place all members from the reserved categories in only the worst colleges or branch. 14 In many states, there is an oversupply of colleges. Therefore, the reservations are not always binding-individuals are not closed out of engineering colleges due to the quota systems. This was not the case in the state discussed in this paper in 1996. Thirty thousand nine hundred fifty-nine applicants sat for the exam to gain admission for 2643 seats across 14 engineering colleges. Due to the high demand for engineering degrees, this state saw a boom in engineering colleges, particularly unaided, private colleges. By 1998, the number of available seats rose to 4997. We planned to survey applicants who were both above and below the admission cutoff in each caste category. However, in this particular context, the "true" cutoff scores for admission are unknown. Figure 1 presents test score distributions by caste category. As we already indicated above, lower-caste applicants, and especially SC applicants, scored lower on average on the entrance exam. The upper-caste group (general category) and OBC group also had a larger range of test scores than the SC group. 16 Thus, using the data on enrollments, we chose cutoffs of 182 for the SC, 419 for the OBC, and 490 for the upper-caste groups.
These cutoff choices were validated using the method described in Chay, McEwan and Urquiola (2005) , in which the selected cutoff maximizes the goodness of fit from a model of attending engineering college as a function of an indicator equal to one if one's score is below a particular threshold. Figure 2 graphs, for each caste category, the percentage of individuals who actually enrolled as a function of their test score.
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We selected a sample of applicants above and below their caste category cutoff. For the first round of surveys, we restricted ourselves to individuals who lived in one of the four more populous cities in terms of number of applicants. Conditioning on an address in one of these four cities, we then chose for the SC sample the 190 applicants right above the cutoff and 190 applicants right below the cutoff. This sample represented a higher percentage of total number of SC applicants than the 190 applicants right above and right below the cutoff for the other groups. We therefore calculated what percentage of the full list of SC applications our sample comprised, and
The vertical line on each graph indicates the aforementioned cutoff score for that caste category. 15 Unlike the other groups where about 5 to 8 percent of total applicants actually attended engineering universities, 28 percent of ST applicants went to an engineering college. 16 Note that because individuals who are higher ranked can choose which school (and major) they will attend, there could, in theory, be more than one discontinuity (e.g. there could be a discontinuity in admissions for each school and major). Unfortunately, we do not have a large enough sample size to evaluate the impact of admissions to each individual engineering school. 17 To create Figure 2 , the test score distribution for each caste group was broken into 50 bins of equal size, and the percentage of individuals who enrolled in each bin was graphed. 
Survey Design and Outcomes
The survey consisted of two parts. The first part was directed at the parents of the applicant, while the second part was directed at the applicants themselves. Many questions, particularly parental background and child employment outcomes, were similar on both the parent and applicant surveys, so that if the applicant could not be interviewed,
we could still collect their basic outcomes data from surveying their parents. When both the parent and the applicant could be located, we continued to ask each of them both sets of questions to be able to assess the accuracy of the parent's responses on applicant's educational and employment history.
In the survey, we collected data to inform the policy debate regarding affirmative action. First, we collected data on the background of parents to allow us to determine the social standing of those aided by the reservations. Second, we documented the educational and employment histories of the applicants to determine the economic consequences of attending an engineering college. Finally, we gathered information to understand whether educational opportunities also affected non-economic outcomes, such as the identity of one's friends or one's perceptions and preferences.
enumerators went door to door and asked the neighbors for contact information. 19 The survey was primarily conducted in person, but if the applicant or parents had moved out of the city, the survey was conducted by phone.
Overall, 663 parents and 407 applicants were both found and agreed to participate in the survey, for a total of 721 households.
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Appendix Table 1 compares located households with households that could not be located, by cutoff status and caste category. First, as Panel A shows, our ability to locate a given household was about the same regardless of whether or not that household was above or below the score cutoff; this is true for all three caste groups. In the remaining panels of Appendix Table 1 , we compare basic characteristics (as available in the entrance exam data)
between located and non-located households. Column 1 presents the difference (between located and non-located households) in the characteristic of interest for those above the threshold, while column 2 presents the same difference for those below the threshold. Column 3 presents the differences between Columns 1 and 2, with standard errors reported in parentheses below. While there are slight differences in test score, gender, age, and likelihood of attending engineering college between located and non-located households, these differences are not systematically related to the score cutoffs.
The When only the parents were found, we used data from the parents' survey to supplement the applicant's outcome information, and vice versa. To confidently use this method, we would expect that parents and children would be able to accurately answer questions regarding one another. Appendix Table 2 confirms that they do,
showing high correlations between answers given by the child and his/her parent for key questions, such as father's income, applicant's employment status, and applicant's income. Table 1A reports on the socio-economic background of our survey respondents. For variables on family background, data from the parent survey were used when available; when the parent survey data were missing, data from the applicant survey were used. For the variables containing personal information on the applicant, data primarily come from the applicant survey; for cases in which the applicant was not found, the variable takes on the value of the equivalent question in the parent survey. Column 1 reports means for the entire sample; columns 2, 3, and 4 report means for upper-caste, OBC and SC groups, respectively. The p-values for comparisons of means across groups are reported in the remaining columns of Table 1A . Panel A focuses on characteristics of the main income earner in each applicant's household (as of 1996), while Panel B provides some background information about the applicants themselves. One star indicates significance at the 10 percent level, two stars indicate significance at the 5 percent level, and three stars indicate significance at the 1 percent level.
Results
Who applies to engineering colleges? Who gains admission due to the reservation policy?
As a benchmark, we also provide in Table 1B socio-economic information for households from the urban areas of the Indian state where our research occurs. This table was constructed from the 55 th round of the National Sample Survey of India (NSS) that was conducted in 1999-2000. Unfortunately, the NSS does not contain all background variables we collected in our survey. Thus, Table 1B lists the following variables from the NSS that are most equivalent to the data we collected: a dummy variable for whether the head of household's education was below a graduate degree, a dummy variable for whether the head of household worked regularly, monthly consumption expenditures (in Rs 1999), and a dummy for whether the head of household works as an engineer. The column structure of Table 1B is identical to that of Table 1A .
Not surprisingly, applicants to engineering colleges are positively selected compared to other individuals in the state. While 80 percent of household heads in the NSS did not complete a graduate degree (where a graduate degree is equivalent to a U.S. college degree), this fraction is only 36 percent among applicants' households.
Applicants to engineering colleges are also more likely to be part of a household in which the head is employed.
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22 Note that the employment status question in the NSS is not completely equivalent to the employment status question in our survey.
Finally, there is strong inter-generational correlation in career choice: while only about 1 percent of the households in the NSS are headed by engineers, 13 percent of the applicants to engineering colleges originate from households in which the head was an engineer. Finally, engineers are more common household heads among the upper-caste group (2 percent) than among the OBC and SC groups (1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively).
A comparison of the information in Tables 1A and 1B shows that the positive selection among applicants to engineering colleges occurs across all three caste groups. Importantly, though, the positive selection among OBC and SC applicants is not so severe that their background characteristics become similar to those of the upper-caste applicants. Instead, there remain large and statistically significant differences in socio-economic background between the lower-and upper-caste groups (Table 1A) . For example, 30 percent of heads of upper-caste households have at least a master's degree, compared to 16 and 13 percent for OBC and SC households,
respectively. There are also systematic differences in parental income across the three groups, with heads of lowercaste households earning 30 to 40 percent less than heads of upper-caste households. Furthermore, lower-caste applicants are less likely to have attended an English-language private school and more likely to have attended a government school. While OBC applicants are better off than SC applicants, on average, the "economic distance" between these two types of applicants is smaller than the distance between the average upper-caste and average lower-caste applicant; this is especially true with regard to parental education and income. With these assumptions, we can calculate the score on the entry exam that would have been the threshold for admission in the absence of the reservation policy-that is, in an environment in which all applicants are ranked on the same list. This threshold score is, by construction, higher when we assume a 70 percent rate than when we assume a 50 percent rate. Using the respondents' score on the entry exam, we can then identify the individuals who would have been admitted in the absence of the reservation policy and those who would not have been admitted.
We can also compare the socio-economic background of those who would have been admitted but were not (e.g.
the "displaced") and those who would not have been admitted but were (e.g. the "displacing"). We present this comparison in Table 2 . We assume a 50 percent enrollment rate in Columns 1 through 3, and a 70 percent rate in Columns 4 through 6. Columns 1 and 4 report average background characteristics for displaced applicants, while Columns 2 and 5 report average background characteristics for displacing applicants. We report the p-values for tests of comparison of means in Columns 3 and 6. The background characteristics we consider are the same as in Table 1A . However, we find that the policy appears to hurt female applicants. This pattern emerges regardless of the enrollment rate assumed, but is only statistically significant under the assumption of a 50 percent rate. Under the assumption of the 50 percent rate, 73 percent of those "displaced" by the reservation policy are males, compared to 84 percent of those "displacing." This finding is not surprising given that the share of female applicants is higher in the upper-caste group than in the OBC and SC groups.
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23 Henriques and Wankhede (1985) find that individuals from lower-caste groups that complete secondary school disproportionately tend to be male. Thus, it follows that college applicants from these lower-caste groups would also disproportionately tend to be male.
This suggests that the targeting of lower castes may negatively interact with the advancement of women on the engineering career track.
Summary Statistics: Labor Market Outcomes
In Table 3 , we summarize the labor market outcomes, by caste category. For each variable, we report average outcomes across all survey respondents-that is, whether or not they were admitted and whether or not they went to an engineering college-for the full sample (Column 1), for the upper-caste group (Column 2), for the aggregated lower-caste group (OBC plus SC, Column 3), as well as for OBC and SC (Columns 4 and 5, respectively). In
Column 6, we report the p-value of a comparison of means between the upper-and aggregated lower-caste groups.
At the time of survey, lower-caste applicants, and especially SC applicants, are on average economically worse off as compared to upper-caste applicants. Eighty-one percent of the upper-caste applicants are employed compared to only 69 percent of the lower-caste applicants. The employment rate for SC applicants is especially low (58 percent). While OBC applicants do not differ much from the upper caste in terms of their employment rate, their income is substantially lower (Rs 12,361 per month for OBC compared to Rs 17,706 for the upper-caste group). Unemployed individuals have "zero" income, and therefore it is unsurprising that the SC members, who have a relatively lower employment rate, also have a much lower income (Rs 5,630) than the other groups.
Lower-caste and upper-caste applicants also hold different types of jobs. Upper-caste applicants are more likely to work as engineers and to be employed in the private sector. These differences are especially salient for the SC group. For example, 47 percent of upper-caste applicants work as engineers, compared to only 28 percent of SC applicants. Interestingly, despite the higher propensity of the upper caste to work in the private sector, we do not see a difference between the members of the different groups on how they obtained their job. Specifically, there are no statistically significant differences across the groups in the likelihood of having relied on social networks (friends and family) to find their current or last job, even though the averages point towards slightly less use of social networks among SC applicants (7 percent, compared to 11 percent among upper-caste applicants).
OLS Estimates of Returns to Education
In Table 4 , we report OLS estimates of the impact of attending an engineering college (went i ) on income:
We present these estimates for the full sample of respondents (Panel A), but also separately for the upper-caste group (Panel B) and lower-caste groups (OBC+SC in Panel C). We report the results of two regression models:
one in which we only control for a vector of individual characteristics (Column 1) and one in which we control for individual characteristics, household characteristics, and city of origin (Column 2). The individual-level controls are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, and dummies for the type of secondary school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school, or government school). The household-level controls are household-head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational attainment of the household head, a dummy for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household. We also control for whether the data come from the parent or child survey in all regressions.
In the full sample (Panel A), we find that individuals who started engineering school in 1996 earn between Rs 3,500 to Rs 4,000 more per month . The addition of controls for household characteristics tends to reduce the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, but the changes are economically small and are not statistically significant.
In Panels B and C, we compare OLS estimates of the returns to attending engineering college between the upper-and aggregated lower-caste groups. We find that the coefficients on attending the engineering college are 16 larger in magnitude for upper-caste applicants. Attending engineering college in the state in 1996 is associated with an additional Rs 5,400 per month for upper-caste applicants and Rs 3,200 for lower-caste applicants in the econometric specification in which we only control for individual-level characteristics. The difference is smaller (Rs 3,700 versus Rs 2,700) in the specification in which we also control for household-level characteristics. Since the lower-caste group has lower earnings on average (Table 3) , attending engineering school is associated with a higher percentage increase in income for that group. Specifically, attending engineering school increases monthly income by 80 to 90 percent for lower-caste respondents (statistically significant) compared to 50 to 70 percent for upper-caste respondents (not statistically significant); because standard errors are large, we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that these effects are of the same magnitude
In summary, the OLS regressions suggest positive and significant returns to attending engineering college, even in the lower-caste groups. This contradicts the extreme view that seats in engineering colleges are "wasted" on lower-caste candidates because they do not have the preparation to utilize the engineering degree. From a welfare perspective, these OLS point estimates of income-level effects suggest that a seat in engineering college occupied by a lower-caste applicant yields lower economic returns than if that same seat was occupied by a general-caste applicant. It is worth stressing, however, that the large standard errors prevent us from drawing unequivocal conclusions. Another obvious limitation of the OLS estimates is that they do not unambiguously warrant a causal interpretation. We turn to this issue in the next section.
IV Estimation Empirical Strategy
While a natural starting point, the OLS results reported above are subject to important interpretational issues. Our sample includes students who scored above and below the admission threshold in their caste category on the 1996 entry exam. Part of the variation in who attended engineering college that we exploit in the OLS regressions is driven by variation in who scored above and below the admission threshold in their caste group, while another part of the variation is driven by one's decision of whether or not to attend, conditional on having been admitted. This second source of variation is clearly problematic when one tries to measure the causal effect of attending engineering college. First, suppose that only those applicants who saw the greatest return to going to engineering college did so. In this case, we would clearly overestimate the causal effects of attending engineering college.
Second, the decision of whether or not to attend, conditional on having been admitted, may be driven by liquidity constraints at the household level, with cash-constrained individuals not being able to forego several years of earnings in order to invest in education.
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One remaining concern, of course, is that there are systematic unobservable differences between those who scored above and below the admission thresholds that would induce differences in their current labor-market outcomes, even in the absence of an engineering education. We attempted to form a homogenous group of survey respondents, given our survey constraints. Our sample is first limited to the group of individuals that passed the first-round 10+2 examinations. We then limited our sample to those who scored in the upper half of the secondround entrance exams. Below, we formally test for whether our sample forms a homogenous group for a set of Third, the selection into attending, conditional on having been admitted, may also reflect variation in outside options. For example, suppose that a seat in medical school is preferred to a seat in engineering school; then only those who did not make it into medical school will attend engineering school.
Hence, we have included among those who did not attend engineering school some individuals who went instead to medical school, leading us to underestimate the causal effect of attending engineering school. Furthermore, if there is systematic variation in the quality of these outside options across caste categories, this would invalidate any comparison of the OLS returns to attending engineering college across caste categories. For example, if upper-caste applicants systematically have superior outside options than lower-caste applicants, the OLS model might give us an underestimate of the difference in the returns between the upper-and lower-caste groups.
In this section, we propose alternative estimates of the returns to attending engineering college that only rely on the first source of variation listed above: variation in who scored above and below the admission thresholds on the entry exam. Specifically, we will use score-cutoff dummies (cutoff i ) as instruments for attending engineering college (went i ):
Relying only on this source of variation allows us to rule out biases due to selection in the decision to attend, conditional on having been admitted.
18 observable background characteristics. We then go one step further and restrict the sample of survey respondents to those whose score on the entry exam is even closer to the cutoff for their caste category. In practice, we construct for each caste category a "discontinuity sample" in which we drop those survey respondents who scored below the As we just discussed, we start in Table 5 by testing whether, within each caste category, there are any systematic differences in pre-characteristics between those who score above and below the cutoff on the entry exam. If there are no systematic differences in observable characteristics, one may feel more confident that there are no systematic differences in unobservable characteristics around that cutoff. Each cell in Table 5 corresponds to a different regression. Each regression relates the dependent variable in that row on the cutoff dummy that is relevant for the group in that column. Reported in each cell is the estimated coefficient on the cutoff dummy, with standard errors in parentheses. When we pool both lower-caste groups together (Columns 3 and 4), we also include in each regression a dummy for OBC status.
25 25 Results for the individual minority groups look very similar, and are available upon request from the authors.
Odd columns focus on the full samples and even columns focus on the discontinuity samples.
There are very few cases in which we find statistically significant differences between those applicants who are above the cutoff and those who are below. This is true in both samples. Not surprisingly, in many cases the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the cutoff dummies are smaller in the discontinuity samples than in the full samples, but there are several exceptions. To determine the joint significance of the cutoff variables on all of the outcomes, we estimated a SUR model; we list the chi-square statistic and p-value that tests for the joint significance of the cutoff variable in the SUR model in the final two rows of Table 5 . This test, and the other evidence reported in Table 5 , confirms that applicants above and below the cutoff do not appear statistically different in terms of their background characteristics, thus providing some support for our strategy of using the score cutoff dummies as instruments for having attended engineering college.
Results
We report our results in Table 6 . Panel A shows the results from the first stage regressions, while Panel B provides the results from the IV analysis. In columns 1 -4, we present the results for the upper caste group, while in columns 5 -8 we present those for the pooled lower caste groups.
In the first stage regressions, the dependent variable in all regressions is "went," a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual enrolled in engineering college in 1996 in the state under study and 0 otherwise. We then consider four different models. Models 1 and 2 use the full samples of survey respondents within a given caste category. Model 1 simply consists of regressing "went" on a dummy for the group-specific cutoff (as well as a dummy for the OBC category for the lower caste group), while Model 2 includes a vector of individual controls, household background control, and city of origin fixed effects. Models 3 use the discontinuity samples, replicating Model 2 (e.g. including the full list of controls). Finally, in Model 4, we present an alternative method of controlling for family background characteristics; we control for the quadratic in admissions exam score.
All of the first-stage regressions reported in Table 6 statistically confirm the association between the likelihood of attending engineering college in 1996 and scoring above the cutoff on the entry exam. Not surprisingly given our findings in Table 5 , the addition of individual-and household-level characteristics to the econometric model (Model 2) barely changes the estimated coefficients on the cutoff. However, we do see a sharp drop in the coefficient of the cutoff when controlling for the quadratic in score, particularly for the upper caste group. The decrease in the power of the instrument suggests that our second stage estimation will be less precise.
Regardless of the model employed, we do see a smaller estimate of the cutoff dummy for upper-caste applicants compared to lower-caste applicants. This indicates that a smaller fraction of upper-caste admits end up attending engineering college. This could possibly reflect the fact that the general-caste admits face a larger set of educational choices.
We report the two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of attending engineering college on income in Panel B. We estimate the IV estimates for all four models presented in Panel A. The point estimates on the returns to attending engineering college are similar across the specifications. All the IV estimates show positive returns to attending engineering college, and tend to be larger than the OLS estimates presented in Table 4 . In Models 1 and 2, attending engineering college increases the monthly income of upper-caste individuals by between Rs 9,000 and 20
Rs 13,000 (statistically significant); in contrast, attending engineering college increases the monthly income of lower-caste applicants by between Rs 5,500 and Rs 6,500 (statistically significant). In Column 3, we present results from the analysis of the discontinuity samples, in which we drop the top 25 percent and bottom 25 percent of scores in each caste group. While the magnitude of estimate is very similar to Models 1 and 2, the estimated effect is unfortunately noisy. This lack of power is, in part, a reflection of the small sample sizes in the discontinuity regressions. In Model 4, the pattern in the coefficient is again positive and roughly the same magnitude in Model 1, however, results in high standard error, particularly for the upper caste group. This reflects the weaker first stage (Panel A) for this model.
In Table 7 , we estimate the differences in the IV-estimated returns across the upper caste and lower caste groups. Models 1 -4 correspond to Models 1 -4 in Table 6 . We find a large return to attending engineering college, between Rs 11,000 to 16,000 (significant in Models 1 -3). However, we find evidence that the level returns are lower for the lower caste groups (significant in Models 1 and Models 3).
Overall, the findings in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that, contrary to the arguments of some critics of affirmative action, lower-caste applicants derive positive returns from affirmative action. However, there is some evidence that suggests some aggregate costs to these programs: allowing an upper-caste applicant to occupy a seat that has been reserved for a lower-caste applicant would boost aggregate income.
Job Characteristics
In Table 8 , we explore the returns to attending engineering college on job characteristics. For brevity, we only present IV estimates for these outcomes. For each dependent variable of interest (as listed in the first column), we present the results of four different models corresponding to the four first-stage specifications from Table 6 . Each cell corresponds to a separate regression and reported in the cell is the estimated coefficient on "went to engineering college" (with standard errors in parentheses). In both tables, Panel A focuses on the upper-caste sample and Panel B on the aggregated lower-caste sample.
We find that attending engineering college has a strictly positive, but smaller, impact on one's likelihood of working as an engineer for lower-caste compared to upper-caste individuals (Row 1). We, next, study the impact of attending engineering school on whether one works in the private sector, works in the public sector, is self-21 employed, or works in a family business.
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In Table 9 , we investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the income effects we estimate based on the socioeconomic background of the applicants. To proceed, we first summarize a given individual's socio-economic background characteristics into a single index. We do this by regressing a given individual's test score on the vector of individual and household background variables introduced above. From this estimation, we compute a predicted test score variable and assign each individual a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual's predicted test score is below the median within his or her caste category and 0 otherwise ("Disadvantaged"). We, then, replicate in Both lower-and upper-caste members see their likelihood of being selfemployed or working in a family business decline by about the same amount (10 percentage points) after attending engineering college. Most of the extra employment generated among general-caste members is in the private sector. For lower-caste members, the point estimates indicate higher employment in both the private and government sectors, but these estimates are very noisy. The growth in public-sector employment, however, suggests that part of the positive employment effects of attending engineering college for lower-caste candidates may be linked to other affirmative action programs in the labor market.
Finally, we examine is whether a given individual used friends and family to find his or her current or last job. Interestingly, among upper-caste candidates, having attended engineering school appears to be a substitute for relying on social networks when searching for a job; we find no such substitution pattern in the lower-caste groups.
Controlling for all background characteristics, the difference in the coefficients between the upper-and lower-caste groups is significant across all four models. There are many possible interpretations for this finding. One possibility is that upper-caste applicants can compensate for the lack of a good education by relying on wellconnected friends and family members to find a job, but that this compensation mechanism does not exist for lower-caste applicants. Another possibility is that lower-caste applicants derive value from the assistance of wellconnected friends and family members in their job search, even when they have attended engineering school, maybe because their educational background carries less weight among employers.
Does family background affect the estimated returns?
26 The missing category is "working for an NGO."
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Columns 1 -3 of Table 9 the IV models estimated in Models 1, 2, and 4 of Table 6 , but add to the models an interaction term between going to engineering college and the "disadvantaged" dummy variable.
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Conclusion
The most striking finding in Table 9 is for lower-caste applicants (Panel B). For this group, we find very different returns to attending engineering college by socio-economic background. Applicants who come from a better background benefit more from attending engineering college than those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This pattern holds in all three columns of Table 9 . In fact, our estimates indicate very small returns to attending engineering school among those lower-caste applicants who come from poorer backgrounds. This suggests some strong complementarities between education and socio-economic background for lower-caste
candidates. In contrast, we see no such complementarities for upper-caste applicants. In fact, the effects we estimate point toward higher returns to attending engineering college among the upper-caste applicants coming from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
In Table 10 , we formally test whether there is a difference in the return for those from different socioeconomic backgrounds. We find a significantly lower return for attending engineering colleges for disadvantaged members of the lower caste group. Hence, these findings paint a somewhat less optimistic picture of the reservation policy when it comes to benefiting lower-income groups (and not just lower-caste groups).
Specifically, while we showed earlier (in Table 2 ) that the targeting of lower-caste groups does lead to the admission of students of a lower socio-economic background, Table 9 suggests that the reservation policy may provide greater benefits to those who are already economically better-off within the lower-caste groups. We can hypothesize on possible channels through which socio-economic status (SES) may continue to affect outcomes, post-admission. First, higher SES lower-caste members may find it easier to make it through college. For example, they may not need to work during college or they may be better able to draw upon friends and family in the learning process. Second, higher SES lower-caste members may find the post-graduation job market easier to navigate. For example, their social networks may help them take better advantage of their degree.
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Our analysis suggests that the affirmative action policy redistributes resources to minority groups. Contrary to the arguments of some critics, the policy does not merely crowd out economically-disadvantaged upper-caste students to make way for economically-advantaged lower-caste students. The individuals who are displaced by the program come from stronger socio-economic backgrounds than the displacers. Hence, by targeting disadvantaged caste groups, the policy achieves some income targeting without generating any of the behavioral distortions typically associated with income targeting. While admittedly somewhat more noisy, our analysis of labor market outcomes suggests that, despite their low test scores, the marginal admits from lower castes earned significant returns from attending engineering college; this is in contrast with the view that the academic resources that are devoted to the lower-caste students are totally wasted on them. However, we also identify efficiency costs of the program and limitations to its ability to redistribute. First, like other redistributive programs, our point estimates indicate that the affirmative action policy comes at an economic cost: the marginal lower-caste admit experiences a smaller income increase than the increase that would have been experienced by the marginal general-caste admit. Second, and most troublesome, our results suggest that among the lower-caste admits, it is those from stronger socioeconomic backgrounds who benefit most from the reservation policy. This result somewhat weakens the case that the policy benefits the economically disadvantaged.
This study contributes to the literature on affirmative action by taking advantage of both a straightforward policy experiment and a comprehensive dataset that provides information not only on the individuals who obtained admissions to higher education due to affirmative action, but also on those who were denied admissions as a result of affirmative action. Our findings also offer clear directions for future work. First, our analysis focuses on educational reservations in one state and one field (engineering). We see great value in replications of this research in other educational fields and other regions: relationships between advantaged and disadvantaged groups vary greatly across regions, and the nature of the educational production function may also vary significantly across fields. Second, our research suggests the economic and redistributive trade-offs that are involved in affirmative action. Future research should be prepared to further understand these social costs, and to compare affirmative action policies to other approaches with similar social objectives.
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Notes: 1. The figures provide the distribution of test scores for applicants to engineering colleges in 1996, by caste group.
C. Scheduled Castes
A. Upper Caste Groups Comparison of Means (p-value) Means 4. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Table 1A reports the mean background characterics of the applicants and their families in 1996. 2. Table 1B reports the mean background characteristics of a random sample of housheolds who live in urban areas of the state of India where our study occurs. The data for this table comes from the National Sample Survey of India, 55th Round.
3. Column 1 presents the mean for the full sample, while columns 2 -3 report the means by caste groups. Columns 5 -7 present p-values for the difference in means between each of the indicated groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 2. Columns 1-3 assume a 50% percent rate of acceptance of an admissions offer, providing a total sample size of 159. Column 1 presents the mean for the displaced, while column 2 reports the mean for the displacing. Column 3 presents the p-value of the difference in means. Columns 4-6 replicate Columns 1-3, assuming a 70% yield (N=132).
1. This table compares mean background characteristics of individuals displaced by affirmative action polices ("displaced") and with the mean for those who gained admissions due to affirmative action police ("displacing").
50%
Yield p-value of difference in means 3. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***. 2. Column 1 reports the mean for the full sample. Column 2 reports the mean for the upper caste caste groups. Column 3 presents the mean outcomes for the pooled lower caste groups, while column 4 and 5 report the means for the two main lower caste categories, OBC and SC respectively. Column 6 reports the p-value of the difference in means between the upper and lower caste groups.
3. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***. 3. The Chi-squared and p-value of a SUR regression for joint significance are listed on the last two rows. Uses Computer in Job are excluded in order to be able to run the SUR model.
B. Employment Characteristics
4.
Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***. 6. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***. 
B. Characteristics of Engineering Applicant
B. IV Analysis of Impact of Attending Engineering College on Income
1. In Panel A, each coefficient contains the result of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is "went to engineering college." The reported coefficient is on "above cutoff for admissions." In Panel B, each coefficient contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is either income. The reported coefficient is on "went to engineering college," which is instrumented by "above cutoff for admissions."
2.In Columns 1-4, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Columns 5-8 includes lower caste applicants. 3. The individual-level controls are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, dummies for the type of secondary school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school or government school), and controls for whether or not the outcome data comes from the parent or child survey. The household-level controls are household head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational attainment of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household. 6. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***. , and controls for whether or not the outcome data comes from the parent or child survey. The household-level controls are household head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational attainment of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household.
4. In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25% test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample.
5. Standard errors in parentheses. 6. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is as indicated. The reported coefficient is on "went to engineering college," which is instrumented by "above cutoff for admissions."
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower 3. See Table 6 for a discussion of the included control variables. 4. In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25% test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample. 3. Standard errors in parentheses. 4. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste applicants.
1. Each column in a panel presents the results of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is income. Disadvantaged is a dummy variable which indicates whether an individual was below the predicted median score for his or her caste group. 3. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
